A UBS trader's unauthorised trades cost over US$2 billion
UBS (Adoboli) · Banking (listed)
The case in brief
Visible before detection
Checks that could have surfaced it, on hindsight
Third-party confirmation
Would have confirmed trades with counterparties.
Can mislead when: Counterparties can collude or ignore requests. A non-response is logged as a gap, never as a pass.
Books edit log
Would have flagged booked-then-cancelled trades.
Can mislead when: Logs can be disabled at database level (auditors qualified this in year one) or tampered with on export. Kubr needs the company to cooperate.
Governance signals
Would have tested supervision.
Can mislead when: Private companies file late, so these signals are lagging. Kubr uses them to support other flags, not to prove anything alone.
Where Kubr services would have helped
Verified Snapshot
Offered in India- C11 Would have tested supervision.
Financial diligence
Offered in India- C12 Would have flagged booked-then-cancelled trades.
Legal diligence support
Offered in India- C11 Would have tested supervision.
Promoter profiles
Offered in India- C11 Would have tested supervision.
Mapped from the checks each service runs. A hindsight reading of public records, not a promise that the failure would have been found.
Same pattern
A summary of public documents. It reports what the sources say. It is not Kubr's finding and not a statement of guilt.